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Fractured America: How did we get
here?
Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler
1 An August  2020 CBS Poll  asked Americans whether  they considered the number of
fatalities from Covid-19 – then around 170,000 in the United States – acceptable. The
vast majority of Americans, including 90% of Democrats, said it was not. But among
Republicans, fully 57% did deem it acceptable, though many also wondered whether the
number of deaths was being exaggerated. Regardless, the reporting of that poll was
accompanied by widespread shock that so many Republicans could be so blasé about
such  extensive  suffering  and  death,  especially  since  the  experience  of  most  of  the
industrialized world made clear that a toll of that size was eminently preventable1.
2 This is one of countless data points that illustrate how deeply divided Americans are on
the most basic political, social and cultural questions of our time. Even when it comes
to  objective  conditions,  Republicans  and  Democrats  often  see  the  world  in
fundamentally different ways. Indeed, the language most commonly used by political
scientists to describe this divide, “political polarization” or “partisan polarization,” has
itself arguably become too bloodless to capture adequately the nature, intensity and
consequence of the extraordinary rift in American society. All of that is happening in a
context  in  which  Americans  on  all  sides  believe  that  more  is  at  stake  in  the  2020
election than any they can remember. For supporters of Donald Trump, America as
they know it may be lost forever if he loses. For Trump’s detractors, the very fate of
American democracy is on the line.
 
How did we get here?
3 For most of the 20th century, most scholars thought US politics generated only “low
heat” because of its two-party system, in which parties had unique incentives to appeal
to the political middle. We agree American politics of the 20th century was mostly low
heat, but we disagree about why. Instead the heat was low because the specific issues at
the center of party contestation were not ones that especially stirred voters’ passions.
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Until  the  1960s,  the  main  fault  line  in  American  politics  was  about  the  size  of
government and the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union. Although race and racism
have always been pervasive features of American life, they didn't express themselves in
partisan political conflict through most of the 20th century. Both parties were internally
divided on these matters and reticent about addressing the roots of racism. As such, the
parties mostly worked to downplay racial  issues and instead focused on class-based
appeals. 
4 Beginning in the 1960s and accelerating in the decades that followed, racial issues and
other moral and identity-based issues became the fault line that divided Republicans
and Democrats. On race, for example, the Republican Party began to identify itself with
skepticism of civil rights, connected to fear of growing crime and lawlessness. They
appealed to  blue collar  workers  –  mostly  Democrats  at  the time –  by promising to
impose law and order to ensure that these workers’ neighborhoods would be safe from
the  ravages  caused  by  liberal  excesses  and  the  racial  tumult  unfolding  on  their
television sets in 1960s America. 
5 Race was the first issue to open the new fault line, but it would soon be reinforced by
several  other  issues.  A  series  of  monumental  social  changes,  including  the  rise  of
feminism and changing family structures, the emergence of gay rights and marriage
equality and the growing importance of terrorism, especially after the 9/11 attacks, all
contributed to this newly reconfigured divide. These sorts of issues, we believe, prompt
much more gut-level, instinctive “reasoning” than do questions of tax policy and the
size  of  government,  the  sorts  of  issues  that  dominated  politics  for  the  first  three
quarters of the century. 
6 As these gut level issues came to dominate our politics, Americans began to view the
consequences of losing to the other side with growing alarm. What was at stake in
losing an election wasn’t whether your taxes might go up or down, though Americans
certainly still fight over that. What was on the line, increasingly, was a fundamental
clash over the most basic questions of right and wrong. When such deeply held, visceral
differences  become  the  foundation  of  politics,  the  stakes  of  losing  increase
dramatically. 
7 For fifteen years now, we have been cataloguing, analyzing and trying to explain the
fact, feel and significance of America’s great divide. Reflecting back, it is striking that
when we first wrote about it in 2005, the nature and depth of the divide would seem
almost quaint by today’s standards. What we have come to call the worldview divide
was only then taking root. America saw no violence in the streets as we see on a regular
basis today. Partisans disliked the other party, but they didn’t hate them like they do
now. The Republican standard bearer then, George W. Bush, tried to unify the country
after 9/11. Donald Trump, the Republican standard bearer now, stokes division as soon
as he gets out of bed each morning.
8 The  chasm  in  American  society  has  deepened  and  widened  into  areas  of  life  that
previously did not seem to merit political analysis. By now it’s considered axiomatic
that Democrats and Republicans are worlds apart. In fact, that increasingly even means
where they prefer to live (more urban or more rural areas), what they prefer to eat
(American food or ethnic cuisine), wear (traditional or fashionable) and drive (Prius or
pickup truck) are all telling reflections of the divisions that have led many political
analysts to believe that our country is more fractured than at any time since the end of
America’s Civil War in the 19th century. 
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Human Psychology Intersects with Political Context
9 To understand how Americans came to be so divided, it is necessary to understand the
psychological constructs that they use to make sense of the world around them. As we
have explicated above, real world politics has offered up a completely changed partisan
context  from fifty  years  ago.  That  is  part  of  the story.  Understanding polarization,
however, also requires understanding how ordinary people make sense of this changed
context,  psychologically.  We  use  the  term  worldview  to  capture  the  broad  and
instinctive frameworks people use to respond to and make sense of their surroundings.
We begin from the premise that, in general, people react more or less fearfully, more or
less  suspiciously,  and  more  or  less  openly  to  the  world  around  us,  based  both  on
circumstances and on our predispositions. 
10 We have found that how Americans (and in more recent work, not only Americans)
answer four simple questions about how children ought to be raised, provides us with
great insight into people’s worldviews and, in turn, their politics. The four questions
are paired choices, in which respondents are asked which trait is more desirable for
children to have. All the qualities are good ones. People are thus forced to decide which
ones to prioritize.
11 They are
12 • independence or respect for their elders;
13 • curiosity or good manners;
14 • self-reliance or obedience;
15 • being considerate or being well-behaved.
16 Historically,  this  battery  of  questions  has  been  referred  to  as  measuring
“authoritarianism,” a rather dark personality trait put forward by researchers in the
1940s and 1950s to understand why people would follow Nazism. Much of the substance
and the inspiration derives from the work of Theodore Adorno and associates in the
classic postwar work, The Authoritarian Personality. These measures about child rearing
update Adorno’s early work on the subject. Those who prefer independence, curiosity,
being  considerate  and  self-reliance  are  less  authoritarian.  Those  who  say  children
should  respect  elders,  be  obedient,  display  good manners  and be  well-behaved are
considered more authoritarian. 
17 In our 2018 book, Prius or Pickup, we substituted the terms fixed worldview and fluid
worldview for authoritarian and nonauthoritarian. One reason for this change was to
avoid  the  pejorative  connotations  of  the  older  language,  though  the  relationship
between authoritarianism in the parenting questions and support for the increasingly
apparent authoritarian designs of President Trump is undeniable.  Our thinking also
derived in part from the manner in which our analysis extended from strictly political
questions – like whether someone supported restricting immigration or opposed same
sex marriage – to broader lifestyle questions, like what kinds of places people like to
live or what cars people prefer to drive. Clearly the present-day political divide turns
on something far broader than whether a person is more or less likely to succumb to an
authoritarian style leader. The term worldview captures that breadth much better.
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18 The worldview differences we describe are not new. Some people have always been
warier of change and difference, and more comfortable with sameness, predictability
and structure than others. Observations about a worldview spectrum do not explain
why the United States finds itself in such a uniquely perilous moment. Americans have
not,  on  average,  become  more  fixed  in  their  worldview  over  time  even  as  Donald
Trump has come to lead the country. Indeed, on a range of issues, Americans are much
more tolerant of difference than has previously been the case, which is more consistent
with a fluid worldview. 
19 It’s not the presence or level of a particular worldview that explains the tenor of social
division.  What  matters  is  the  configuration of  worldview in  political  and historical
context and the strategic decisions of elites to gain political advantage. As we described
above,  political  elites in the 1960s began to stake out starkly different positions on
cultural issues about which people are likely to viscerally disagree, because of their
very different worldview orientations. Therefore, when voters began to choose their
political allegiances based on those worldview differences – when they began to sort
themselves by worldview – the nature of political conflict changed fundamentally.
20 We  can  demonstrate  this  worldview-based  sorting  using  survey  data  that  includes
those four questions about the best qualities for children to have. Back in 1992, the first
year those questions appeared on a major national survey, people’s answers didn’t tell
us  a  thing  about  their  partisanship.  Those  who  had  fixed  worldviews  were  about
equally likely to say they were Democrats or Republicans. The same was true of fluid
people. At this point, the parties were not yet sorted by worldview. By 2004, that had
changed.  People  with  fixed  worldviews  were  much  more  likely  to  identify  as
Republicans and fluid voters were likelier still  to identify as Democrats. Since then,
sorting by worldview has deepened further. That suggests that the change in political
context over the previous generation resulted in the sorting of voters into the parties
based on worldview. And a politics that cleaves partisans into different camps based on
their sense of how the world is produces a uniquely polarized environment.
 
What It Means for 2020
21 One survey question,  from 2016,  illustrates  especially  well  what  is  at  root  of  these
worldview styles and how it matters. Americans were asked which of two visions of the
world was closer to their own. One, that “the world is a big beautiful place, mostly full
of good people who we must find a way to embrace each other”. The other, that “our
lives are threatened by terrorists, criminals and immigrants and that we must defend
ourselves”  against  them.  On the  one  side  is  outward  looking  understanding  of  the
world,  and  on  the  other  is  a  much  darker  view –  American  carnage  to  some.  Not
surprisingly, roughly 80% of Clinton voters said the former came closer to their view of
the world. An equal proportion of Trump voters said the latter did. 
22 The events of the last number of months illustrate further this worldview divide and
how it will express itself electorally. The US has been riven by racial violence across
many cities since the Spring. Rather than trying to quell the racial unrest, which was
brought on by unwarranted police violence against people of color, Republicans seem
invested in fanning the flames. They believe that more disorder and chaos will cause
swing voters  to  recognize that  their  worldview best  characterizes  the needs of  the
country. The country does not need to change. Racial and ethnic minorities need to
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change. Democrats, in contrast, champion the cause of minority groups. They believe
that the country needs to change to overcome racial inequalities that have persisted for
centuries.
23 But this divide is about more than race, and it is about more than the coming election.
A worldview divide fundamentally  pits  the forces  of  tradition against  the forces  of
innovation, whether that is about race, gender, sexual orientation, or something else. It
embodies a philosophy about how to live life more than it embodies a philosophy about
how to manage politics. That is a polarizing basis for political conflict to be sure.
24 Maybe more important the process of sorting by worldview has created a peril for our
institutions and for civil order that was not previously likely. Donald Trump did not
cause  the  worldview  divide;  it  had  been  in  place  for  a  decade  or  more  before  he
emerged. But it makes the country more vulnerable to someone like Trump, who has
often expressed sentiments quite antithetical to democracy. Because the stakes are so
high and because the vision the other side presents seems so antithetical to basic moral
values, behaviors that seemed previously to violate accepted norms of politics become
justifiable, even necessary, to maintain the “greatness” of the nation’s past. If the other
side is so dangerous,  so bereft of basic character and decency, playing by the rules
becomes a luxury decent people cannot afford. 
25 No modern political figure has framed the stakes in such stark terms as Trump. His
supporters may not hunger for authoritarian rule on its own. But they are perfectly
ready  to  believe  that  any  actions  to  stem  the  threat  liberals  pose  are  acceptable.
Likewise,  liberals  see  in  Trump  a  mortal  threat  to  our  social  and  political  fabric.
Disagreement on specific issues, though those are loud and intense, scarcely matter. It
is the nature and character of the man, and his supporters that is so shocking and
horrifying.  Only  a  politics  whose  foundation  is  itself  so  anchored  in  gut  level
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